## OFF

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First off is politics

#### Patent reform will pass- its top of the docket

Legal Times, 4-8-2014 <http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202650186068/Time+Dwindles+For+Patent+Litigation+Reform+Bill%3Fmcode=1202615034968&curindex=2&curpage=1>

The Senate Judiciary Committee needs to approve a patent reform bill this week—with broad bipartisan support—to give it a good chance of becoming law during this Congress, a former top intellectual property adviser to the committee said. Congress on April 14 begins a two-week recess and, as the November elections inch closer, legislative activity on Capitol Hill will soon slow down, said Aaron Cooper, a Covington & Burling special counsel who formerly advised Senate Judiciary Chairman Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., on intellectual property issues. "I don't think it absolutely has to be done before this recess but I think time certainly is running out on this Congress," Cooper said. "If it doesn’t come together, it doesn't mean it won't ever come together, it just makes it more difficult." Cooper joined Covington in November after working the past seven years on the committee, including primary responsibility for all aspects of the last big patent reform law, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, which was adopted in 2011. The Judiciary Committee was set to meet this afternoon to discuss the leading bill, the Patent Transparency and Improvements Act. Leahy in November introduced the measure with co-sponsors Mike Lee, R-Utah; Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I.; and Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn. Leahy announced today that the hearing will not happen as scheduled because Republicans have not yet given feedback on a proposal about “a few contentious issues” circulated Monday by Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y. “I hope we can come to a bipartisan agreement by the end of the day so that we can mark up my Patent Transparency and Improvements Act on Thursday morning,” Leahy said in a written statement. “The executive business session noticed for this afternoon will be postponed until Thursday morning.” The committee had hoped to move on the bill last Thursday. But committee members are still working on the language for several key provisions that include pleading requirements and shifting legal fees. "We're not quite there yet," Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, the top Republican on the committee, said last week. "Getting the bill right is just as important as moving it," Grassley said. "I hope that we can come together and produce language that a large majority of us can support." Cooper said such a consensus—and not just a 10-8 vote to get it out of committee—would help give the bill momentum to get to the Senate floor. A close vote in the committee could signal that interest groups are dissatisfied and could try to influence the other 82 senators—potentially stalling the legislation. "As we get closer to the end of a Congress, having a bill that is out of committee and ready to go to the floor, supported in the form it was supported in the committee, shows most of the major issues have been worked out," Cooper said. Committee members have expressed optimism that the bill's language can balance a number of competing interests—without becoming watered down—in the fight against so-called "patent trolls" and allegedly frivolous intellectual property cases.

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, t he choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### GOP leadership will push off patent vote after the vote on the plan- can’t muster political will back to back

Jake Sherman covers Congress for POLITICO. He got his start in journalism in high school at The Stamford Advocate, where he became a pro at taking box scores for the sports section. He majored in journalism at George Washington University in D.C. but more accurately got a degree at The GW Hatchet, where he was the men’s basketball beat writer before becoming sports editor and, subsequently, editor-in-chief.¶ During summers, Jake interned at The Journal News (N.Y.) and in the Washington bureaus of the Minneapolis Star Tribune and Newsweek. After finishing a master’s in journalism at Columbia University, Jake became an intern in the D.C. bureau of The Wall Street Journal and Carrie Budoff Brown started in journalism at the York Daily Record in the summer before her freshman year in college. She worked as an editor at The Daily Targum, the student-run newspaper of Rutgers University, and interned at the Richmond Times Dispatch and the New York Times. She worked as a staff writer at the Hartford Courant and the Philadelphia Inquirer before arriving at POLITICO on the day it launched in 2007.¶ Budoff Brown is now a White House reporter who focuses on the intersection of policy and politics in the administration and on Capitol Hill. She has covered the Senate, the 2008 Obama campaign, the health care overhaul bill, Wall Street reform and various tax cut battles in Congress. Politico, 8-28-2013 http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/immigration-reform-95980.html#ixzz2dIFeo4Sb

Immigration reform advocates have a new enemy: the congressional calendar.¶ Fall’s fiscal fights have lined up in a way that could delay immigration reform until 2014, multiple senior House Republican leadership aides tell POLITICO, imperiling the effort’s prospects before the midterm elections.¶ The mid-October debt ceiling deadline — an earlier-than-expected target laid out Monday by Treasury Secretary Jack Lew — is changing the House GOP leadership’s plans to pass immigration bills that month.¶ “If we have to deal with the debt limit earlier, it doesn’t change the overall dynamics of the debate, but — just in terms of timing — it might make it harder to find time for immigration bills in October,” one House Republican leadership aide said.¶ That’s not the only scheduling challenge. There are fewer than 40 congressional working days until the end of 2013 — the unofficial deadline for passing immigration reform — and they’ll present some of the most politically challenging votes for lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. It will be difficult to addimmigration reform to the list, senior aides say.¶ Government funding runs dry on Sept. 30. The nine days the House is in session that month will be crowded with the debate over the continuing resolution to keep the government operating. The GOP leadership will have to reconcile the screams from conservatives who want to use the bill to defund Obamacare with their own desire to avoid a government shutdown. Of course, anything the House approves would need to pass the Democratic-controlled Senate, which will ignore attempts to weaken the law.¶ Immigration reform isn’t certain to die if it slips into 2014, some in GOP leadership say. But major progress must be made in 2013 as it would be too difficult for the House to chart a course in 2014, an election year.¶ At a fundraiser in Idaho on Monday, Speaker John Boehner predicted a “whale of a fight” over the debt ceiling. That skirmish will surface in October. The House is in session for 14 days during that month, but there is certain to be a good deal of debate over passing a bill that would extend the nation’s borrowing authority.¶ GOP leadership is mulling its initial negotiating position, which is sure to include some changes to entitlements, energy policy and the health care law. Boehner’s leadership team also seems open to discussing ways to soften the blow of the sequester in October, which would add yet another explosive issue to the mix.¶ The White House refuses to negotiate with Republicans over the debt limit, leaving little clarity on how the standoff gets resolved — and when.¶ “Congress has already authorized funding, committed us to make expenditures,” Lew told CNBC Tuesday. “We’re now in the place where the only question is will we pay the bills that the United States has incurred. The only way to do that is for Congress to act — for it to act quickly.”¶ A senior administration official said Tuesday that the increasingly crowded fall calendar was why Obama pressed the House to deal with immigration before the August recess. But the Republican leaders need to make time for it, the official said, and they should want to do it sooner rather than later because the pressure from the president and others isn’t going to let up.¶ But the scarce legislative days and the fiscal battles will be welcome to some House Republicans squeamish about voting on immigration reform. There is little support for passing the kind of comprehensive bill approved by the Senate. But even the piecemeal approach being pushed by the House leadership has its fair share of skeptics in the GOP conference.¶ November could provide a window for immigration reform — but two dynamics may interfere.¶ The debt-ceiling deadline could slip to November if tax receipts come in stronger than expected. If Congress votes on the debt ceiling during the eight-day November session, the Republican leadership is skeptical that it would be easy to turn around and vote on even a pared-back version of immigration reform.¶ The willjustwon’t be there, some aides say. A similar situation played out earlier this year, when Boehner delayed in January a vote on Hurricane Sandy relief because it came too soon after the tough vote when Congress raised taxes to resolve the fiscal cliff.¶ December will likely bring another government funding debate. The current plan for September is to pass a continuing resolution that lasts until Dec. 15, setting up another year-end spending fight. The House is scheduled to be in session for just eight days in December before leaving for the holidays.¶ Frank Sharry, executive director of America’s Voice, said the new debt limit deadline “is likely to push consideration of immigration to the latter part of October at the earliest.”¶ But Sharry and Angela Kelley, vice president for immigration policy at the Center for American Progress, said the House won’t be able to use the fiscal fights as an excuse.¶ “There are some in leadership who are going to look for any reason not to act,” Kelley said. “There will be a space where this issue is going to have to move. It’s not going to go away because other matters.”

#### Patent reform key to innovation and American economic security

Goodlatte, 3-12 -- House Judiciary Committee chair, Rep

[Robert (R-VA), "Bipartisan Road Map for Protecting and Encouraging American Innovation," Roll Call 3-12-14, www.rollcall.com/news/bipartisan\_road\_map\_for\_protecting\_and\_encouraging\_american\_innovation-231413-1.html?pg=2, accessed 3-12-14]

Throughout our nation’s history, great ideas have powered our economic prosperity and security, from the Industrial Revolution to the Internet age. Safeguarding those great ideas were so important to our Founding Fathers that they included patent protection in the U.S. Constitution. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution charges Congress with overseeing a patent system to “promote the progress of science and useful arts.” As chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, which has oversight of our patent system, I take the charge to uphold our Constitution seriously. In recent years, we have seen an exponential increase in the use of weak or poorly granted patents by “patent trolls” to file numerous patent infringement lawsuits against American businesses with the hopes of securing a quick payday. This abuse of the patent system is not what our Founding Fathers provided for in our Constitution. At its core, abusive patent litigation is a drag on our economy and stifles innovation. Everyone from independent inventors to startups to mid- and large-sized businesses face this constant threat. The tens of billions of dollars spent on settlements and litigation expenses associated with abusive patent suits represent truly wasted capital — wasted capital that could have been used to create new jobs, fund research and development, and create new innovations and technologies. Bad actors who abuse the patent system devalue American intellectual property and are a direct threat to American innovation. Abusive patent litigation is also a drain on consumers. We will never know what lifesaving invention or next-generation smartphone could have been created because a business went bankrupt after prolonged frivolous litigation or paying off a patent troll. When a firm spends more on patent litigation than on research, money is being diverted from real innovation. The patent system was designed to reward inventors and incentivize innovation, bringing new products and technologies to consumers. Last year, I introduced the Innovation Act (HR 3309), legislation designed to eliminate the abuses of our patent system, discourage frivolous patent litigation and keep U.S. patent laws up to date. In December, the House of Representatives, with overwhelming bipartisan support and the support of the White House, passed the Innovation Act. This important bill will help fuel the engine of American innovation and creativity, creating new jobs and growing our economy. Effective patent reform legislation requires the careful balance that was achieved in the Innovation Act. Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., ranking member Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa., and committee members John Cornyn, R-Texas, Orrin G. Hatch, R-Utah, and Mike Lee, R-Utah, among others, are leading efforts in the Senate to combat abusive practices within our patent system that inhibit innovation. I am optimistic that as the Senate moves toward consideration of legislation they will act just as the House did and pass comprehensive patent litigation reform that includes all of the necessary reforms made in the Innovation Act, including heightened pleading standards and fee shifting. In 2011, Republicans and Democrats came together to pass the America Invents Act (PL 112-29), which brought the most comprehensive change to our nation’s patent laws since the 1836 Patent Act. We are continuing to work again in a collaborative, bipartisan way to end abusive patent litigation to help the American economy and American people. I am optimistic that these important reforms will be enacted to stop the abuse of our patent system and restore the central role patents play in our economy. Half measures and inaction are not viable options. The time is now, and the Innovation Act has helped set a clear bipartisan road map toward eliminating the abuses of our patent system, discouraging frivolous patent litigation and keeping U.S. patent laws up to date.

#### Wars go nuclear – competitiveness solves escalation

Friedberg 8 (Aaron Friedberg is a professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. Gabriel Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J., “The Dangers of a Diminished America,” Wall Street Journal, Ocbtober 21, 2008,<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>)

With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to diminish? If so, what would that mean? One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially-induced isolationism. Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that **rogue states may** choose to **become** ever more **reckless with** their **nuclear toys**, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.

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Next off is the counterplan

#### The 50 state governments of the United States should create and capitalize green banks by re-programing existing state level support for renewable energy. We’ll clarify.

#### Establishment of state green banks creates sustainable low cost financing for renewable energy.

**Berlin, Coalition for Green Capital policy and planning vice president, 2011**

(Kenneth, “Creating State Green Banks: How New Ways to Finance Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency Projects Can Reduce the Cost of Clean Energy and Replace Expiring Federal Credits and Subsidies”, <http://www.stateinnovation.org/Events/Event-Listing/Policy-Directors-Annual-Meeting-2011.aspx>, ldg)

Transitioning to a clean economy will occur only if clean energy and energy efficiency projects are deployed to scale. However, many analysts have described the serious challenge posed by the “deployment valley of death” to new energy technologies. The deployment valley of death problem arises for four basic reasons: (i) most new technologies, even after they become mature enough so there is little technology risk in using the technology, face a long cost curve in which the cost of the technology decrease as the technology reaches scale and is gradually improved; (ii) while renewable energy projects have been dropping in cost, in most cases the delivered cost of energy from clean energy projects is still higher then the delivered cost of energy from existing power generation facilities; (iii) in most states, the utility commission and most political leaders will not support projects that increase more than minimally the delivered cost of electricity; and (iv) it is very unlikely that a cost will be put on carbon emissions on a national level for many years. Thus, despite rapidly dropping costs, new construction in the clean energy industry is still highly dependent on subsidies, grants, and tax credits. In 2010, the federal government provided $14.674 billion in subsides and other support to renewable energy projects and another $14.838 billion to energy efficiency projects (conservation and end use in the chart below). Of this amount, $6.193 billion of the renewable energy funding and $7.854 billion of the conservation and end use programs were provided under ARRA. Because of budget limitations and the end of many programs funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), much of this funding is likely to disappear in the near term. One way for states to proceed is to wait and hold back from supporting clean energy projects until new innovation lowers the cost of these projects enough so that they are cost competitive without any further action by states. Although there are some authors who argue for this approach, there is very little history of the introduction of new innovations in the energy industry that are cost competitive on their first days before they are produced at scale. Most new energy technologies, including breakthrough technologies, require an incubation period and incentives to achieve scale despite early cost disadvantages. Others, even after they become cost competitive, face other difficult barriers to entry. In a 2001 study, Shell concluded that in its industry it took on the average 25 years after the commercial introduction of a primary energy form for a cost competitive technology to obtain a 1% worldwide market share. Meanwhile, current wind and solar technologies are decreasing in cost. Support is needed for innovation research – massive support given the low level of energy R&D in America - but that is no substitute for deployment of existing technologies. States that wait for new innovative technologies are likely to lose out on the deployment of clean energy projects. Bringing energy efficiency projects to scale also requires new sources of financing. Energy efficiency projects generate large numbers of jobs, but bringing energy efficiency projects to scale faces daunting challenges. When faced with a choice of spending scare dollars on energy efficiency rather than other uses, most homeowners and small businessmen, and even many large businesses, choose projects other than energy efficiency. As a result, most energy programs subsidize the cost of energy efficiency projects and many experts believe that 100% subsidies or financing of the upfront costs of energy efficiency projects is needed. Providing these funds will be very costly. According to the Energy Information Agency (EIA), in 2010 there were expected to be 82.56 million single family homes and 25.57 million families living in multiple family homes. While the costs of improving a home’s energy efficiency vary by region and technology, reducing residential energy use by 25 percent by 2020 can cost each homeowner over $10,000. Assuming that each homeowner spent $10,000 to achieve about a 25 percent reduction in energy use, it would cost about $108 trillion. Similarly, EIA estimates that there are about 5 million commercial buildings with about 81.2 billion square feet in the U.S. There are also about 11 billion square feet of industrial floor space in the US. At an average premium for green buildings of $3-5 per square foot, it could cost in the neighborhood of $275 - $460 billion to retrofit this space. States should develop a new model to fund clean energy and energy efficiency programs. The model would recognize that federal and state appropriations, tax credits and other incentives and subsidies will be sharply diminished in the years ahead because of the budget crisis at all levels of government. States would suffer sharp economic losses if they were unable to replace these funds and develop strong clean energy and energy efficiency industries in their state. Developing this new model thus requires a new paradigm on how to finance these projects. Green banks are ideally suited to solve these problems because they offer a practical way for states to make available low-cost financing for project developers in their states. First, they can be established from existing state programs with the equivalent of substantial new resources resulting from their ability to leverage funds – one dollar of leveraged funds could support 5, 10 or even more dollars of investment. Because they would be financial institutions providing debt financing, they would be repaid on their loans, putting them in the position to borrow funds and to establish revolving loan funds that would provide funds that could be reinvested without new sources of financing. Green banks, if established as separate institutions, could issue bonds without the full faith and credit of the state and without restrictions facing states which have limited borrowing capacity. Finally, green banks could seek investors with patient long term capital who are seeking a long term conservative rate of return, such as pension fund investors. Such green banks would finance the deployment of clean energy projects with low technology risks, including projects using existing wind and solar technologies. These projects, because of low technology risk and low financing risk, particularly when they have entered into long term power purchase agreements to purchase their output, should be able to attract investors interested in long tem, safe returns and are thus willing to accept rates of return at a conservative level. State green banks could be expanded to cover innovative, risky new technologies and manufacturing facilities, but each of these presents' different risk factors and would require a different funding "window" within the bank. The details of establishing such windows are not discussed in this paper. In addition, the green bank would provide low cost financing for energy efficiency projects.

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Next off is the disad

#### Implementation of secondary energy reform will pass but it is bogged down by controversy

Gabriel Stargardter and David Alire Garcia 4/1 (April 4, 2014. Mexico national content debate risks turning off oil majors. Reuters Africa)

http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL2N0MB23020140401?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0 Mia

Late last year, Mexico's Congress approved a constitutional reform pushed by President Enrique Pena Nieto that ends state oil giant Pemex's 75-year monopoly, and aims to lure new investment into the sickly energy industry. Secondary legislation that will flesh out the details of the reform are due any day, but one of the main sticking points has been the issue of local content purchasing rules. Lawmakers are deciding whether to follow the example of Brazil, which opted for high levels when it liberalized its oil industry, or copy Norway and Colombia, which both rejected set percentages. Pena Nieto says the energy reform could help drive economic growth to as much as 6 percent a year in Latin America's No.2 economy, which has long lagged regional peers. A key aim of the overhaul is to attract oil majors to boost declining crude output, so policymakers must tread carefully or risk scaring off the same companies that have balked at Brazil's local content requirements. "We are not in favor of prescriptive percentages," Alberto De La Fuente, Shell's top executive in Mexico, said at a recent energy forum in Mexico City. The constitutional reform passed in December says the law should establish "minimum national content percentages" as a way to promote domestic supply chains, but gives no further detail. Javier Trevino, a lawmaker with the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) on the lower house energy committee, left the door open for specific percentage content targets but also acknowledged tensions over which content path to take. "It's the most controversial issue," he said referring to the debate over the energy reform's enabling legislation.

#### Plan triggers backlash- kills agenda

Archibold et al. 13, the New York Times bureau chief for Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, based in Mexico City; graduate at Rutgers University; studied history and Spanish in Panama (Randall C. Archibold, Damien Cave, and Ginger Thomson, April 30th 2013, The New York Time “Mexico’s Curbs on U.S. Role in Drug Fight Spark Friction” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/americas/friction-between-us-and-mexico-threatens-efforts-on-drugs.html?pagewanted=all

But shortly after Mexico’s new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December, American agents got a clear message that the dynamics, with Washington holding the clear upper hand, were about to change. “So do we get to polygraph you?” one incoming Mexican official asked his American counterparts, alarming United States security officials who consider the vetting of the Mexicans central to tracking down drug kingpins. The Mexican government briefly stopped its vetted officials from cooperating in sensitive investigations. The Americans are waiting to see if Mexico allows polygraphs when assigning new members to units, a senior Obama administration official said. In another clash, American security officials were recently asked to leave an important intelligence center in Monterrey, where they had worked side by side with an array of Mexican military and police commanders collecting and analyzing tips and intelligence on drug gangs. The Mexicans, scoffing at the notion of Americans’ having so much contact with different agencies, questioned the value of the center and made clear that they would put tighter reins on the sharing of drug intelligence. There have long been political sensitivities in Mexico over allowing too much American involvement. But the recent policy changes have rattled American officials used to far fewer restrictions than they have faced in years.

#### Nieto has just enough PC for secondary reforms, can’t risk emboldening anti-US sentiment

Politics and Policy 3/31 Politics & Policy (P&P) is a non-partisan student publication seeking to encourage informed political conversation on college campuses around the country. Made up of students of many majors and backgrounds, P&P is a community of individuals interested in why world shaping events occur and what impact these events have on our lives. We publish non-partisan analysis of current events -- local, national and international. We layer the opinions and leverage the minds of many to produce quality, objective analysis. Sam Houskeeper, Valerie Zuckerman, and Alexi Stocker, March 31, 2014,

“Enrique Peña Nieto's Bold Reforms: Striving to Rebuild the Mexican Government,” <http://politicsandpolicy.org/article/enrique-pe%C3%B1a-nietos-bold-reforms-striving-rebuild-mexican-government> Ben

The year 2013 was a period of momentous reform for Mexico. Thanks to the Pact for Mexico, an explicit agreement between parties, Peña Nieto passed numerous reforms that noone would have thought possible a year earlier. If the reforms bear fruit, Mexican telecoms, energy, education, political, education, and other sectors would be radically changed. The passage of 2013’s reforms does not, however, mean that these reforms will be successful. Each reform rests on the passage of secondary laws and regulations to enforce or ensure the implementation of the reforms. The Pact for Mexico broke up at the end of 2013 during the passage of energy reform, one of the most contentious of the debated reforms. Peña Nieto, whose domestic popularity has fallen significantly, now faces an uphill battle to make good on his reforms and kickstart Mexico’s economy, which grew at just above 1% last year, far below Peña Nieto’s promised 4%. Skeptics abound. Meanwhile, Peña Nieto is popular abroad and praised for his level headed reforms. The confidence spurred by his agenda has led to dramatic increases in foreign investment in the country. When Peña Nieto ran for office he also promised a drastic change to Mexico’s drug policy. His predecessor, Felipe Calderon, modeled his approach after anti-insurgency tactics used by Americans in Iraq and focused on a list of the 37 most-wanted cartel operatives. Although this strategy was popular at first, it quickly became unfavorable due to an escalation in violence. Further, it did not target the social conditions that allowed the cartels to flourish in the first place. Peña Nieto promised to create peace agreements with the cartels that would allow them to operate without fear of persecution in exchange for an end to the violence. But, two years into his presidency drug lord Joaquin "Shorty" Guzman and Miguel Angel Treviño Morales, the leader of the Zetas have been apprehended and there is little change to the rates of murder, extortion and kidnapping. Some critics blame the federal government for lacking a unified strategy against organized crime, while others believe pressure from the United States to capture high profile criminals may have influenced strategy. Though Peña Nieto has so far failed to make good on his promises to improve the economy and end the drug war, he has been successful in other areas. In December 2013, Mexico’s Congress approved a piece of legislation that ended Pemex’s seventy-five year monopoly on crude oil production. Although the legal fine print will not be finalized until mid-March, the reforms are a radical step towards liberalizing hydrocarbons in Mexico. Under the new regulations, foreign firms will be free to invest in and exploit Mexico’s oil resources. As legal stipulations released to the public in mid-February reveal, Pemex will not even be required to hold a minority share in any future oil exploitation or production contracts. Further details, due in mid-March, will spell out national content requirements, or how many Mexican energy or service firms must be engaged in the project, for oil exploitation and production contracts. In the case of deepwater offshore fields, national content requirements may be zero. To hardline supporters of the status quo ante, a zero national content requirement smacks of foreign “theft” of Mexico’s natural resources. To President Peña Nieto’s supporters, these reforms open Mexico’s deepwater oil resources to firms armed with the technology, capital, and expertise that Pemex lacks. Dismantling Pemex’s monopoly required a constitutional amendment and damaged the President’s cross-party alliance, the Pact for Mexico; the left-leaning Party of the Democratic Revolution emerged from the wreckage of Peña Nieto’s pact as a committed opponent of energy reform. Nonetheless, the energy reforms passed the Senate, House of Representatives, and cleared the State Assemblies. Peña Nieto waged a successful fight for energy reform, but it cost him politically. On the telecommunications front, President Peña Nieto faces much more powerful, well-connected, and organized opposition. His telecommunications reform bill required a constitutional amendment just like the energy reform bill, but passed the Senate, House of Representatives, and State Assemblies in 2013. The bill created the Federal Telecommunications Institute (ITF), a regulatory body meant to break down Mexico’s powerful telecommunications giants and level the playing fields. Mexican broadband service is both scarce and expensive, resulting in a lucrative, highly profitable industry (Carlos Slim, of América Móvil, is one of the wealthiest men in the world).The ITF recently announced that it had determined which telecommunications firms are “dominant.” Although the agency did not name the firms, it is understood that one of them must be Slim’s América Móvil, which controls roughly eighty percent of Mexico’s fixed line telephone service and seventy percent of its mobile service. Televisa, which controls more than sixty percent of the television market, is also a likely ITF target. The problem, however, is that the ITF has no clear direction from here. Although the agency has identified the “dominant” players in the market, it must wait until the secondary laws of the telecommunications reform bill are worked out. The secondary laws are, however, already two months overdue. Political and corporate pressure makes telecommunications reform less likely to proceed over the next few months. The ITF may be left with little more than a “dominant” ruling. President Peña Nieto’s next steps are anything but certain. Fights for energy and telecommunications reforms have cost him dearly, and his transparency and electoral reforms, which also require constitutional amendments, have yet to pass the State Assemblies. President Peña Nieto must strike a careful balance between expediency and caution, lest he waste or destroy the political goodwill he still has.

#### PEMEX reforms Part II key to set up foreign investment---stimulates Mexico’s oil industry and overall economy

Roman Kilisek 1/8/14 Breaking Energy, “Mexico’s Energy Reforms: Can Mexico Emerge as a Prime Global Oil & Gas Industry Expansion Prospect?” http://breakingenergy.com/2014/01/08/mexicos-energy-reforms-can-mexico-emerge-as-a-prime-global-oil-gas-industry-expansion-prospect/

Mexico is under-exploiting its energy riches and requires both investment and technology to fully develop the oil and gas business and help reverse a nearly decade-long crude oil production decline. Moreover, this reform has the potential to transform Mexico’s economy by translating into surging inflows of foreign direct investment and generating sustainable economic growth.¶ In this regard, Emilio Lozoya Austin, CEO of PEMEX, offers his perspective on the big challenge of Mexico’s energy sector in the World Economic Forum’s latest “Global Energy Architecture Performance Index Report 2014”: ”[W]hile the country has vast hydrocarbon resources, the cost of energy to the economy is relatively high, affecting investment opportunities and productivity growth. Energy reform can (…) play a major role in creating the conditions for sustained economic growth. Over the past decade, North America’s oil and gas industry has experienced a veritable revolution. Deep-water production and shale gas and oil have drastically reduced US dependence on imported oil (…) joining North America’s energy revolution is an opportunity the country cannot afford to miss. (…) To make the most of this opportunity, both [PEMEX and the oil industry] must improve productivity throughout the industry’s value chain, from exploration and production to refining, petrochemicals and distribution and logistics.” Furthermore, Mr. Lozoya Austin estimates that “Mexico’s oil and gas industry has a US$60 billion a year potential for profitable investment.“¶ And this is exactly the crux of the matter. How profitable investment in the Mexican oil and gas sector can be is very much dependent on follow-up regulations. Here a difficult balancing act needs to be struck: Mexico has to offer international oil companies attractive enough returns on capital employed to make them willing partners in developing it’s oil and gas wealth while retaining good enough “equity stakes” in joint projects to beneﬁt and placate Mexicans. This secondary legislation to implement the opening of the energy sector and thereby spelling out the terms and conditions for foreign international oil companies to explore and develop Mexico’s deep-water and shale riches is expected to go before the Congress of Mexico in early 2014.¶ It is about time to tackle the inefficiencies in the Mexican energy sector: Mexico’s already subsidized electricity tariffs are still much higher than in the U.S. or most Western countries. Marco Oviedo at Barclays is quoted in the Financial Times as saying that the “Mexican industry [in 2013] has paid 45 per cent more for its electricity than factories in the U.S.” Mexico had to step up imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as rising industrial demand, falling domestic output from conventional gas fields and limits to pipeline capacity for cheap U.S. shale gas imports forced it to pay multiples more for incremental natural gas supplies.¶ Earlier last year, in what was Mexico’s biggest ever tender issued to procure LNG cargoes to be delivered to its Manzanillo import terminal on the Pacific Coast through 2014, state-run power monopoly CFE in conjunction with PEMEX, the state oil and gas monopoly, eventually secured 17 cargoes to be delivered in 2013 and 12 in 2014. According to data from the U.S. EIA, Mexico’s LNG imports averaged about 0.4 Bcf/d in 2012, representing about 20% of its overall natural gas imports. What an anomaly given the fact that Mexico’s has vast untapped deposits of gas in domestic shale rock formations. However, it will take years for the country to unlock those reserves while facing a severe natural gas shortage in the meantime. Consequently, at least for the medium term new pipeline capacity will be needed. PEMEX is currently building the Los Ramones natural gas pipeline, planned to link the prolific Eagle Ford shale formation – which extends into Mexico – in south Texas to central Mexico’s industrial heartland. By the time it is fully operational, however, domestic natural gas demand will have already outstripped the pipeline’s capacity. Mexico would do well to keep importing cheap US shale gas via pipeline in order to bolster its competitive edge in manufacturing. Labor costs in Mexico are even more competitive than those in China. Overall, cheaper electricity prices would improve Mexico’s competitiveness in a major way due to the fact that lower energy prices are key drivers of economic growth.¶ At the same time, Mexican domestic crude oil production has been falling for nearly 10 years, to about 2.5 million barrels per day from 3.4 million barrels per day in 2004. One reason Mexican crude production has fallen so fast is the precipitous decline of the Cantarell field in the Gulf of Mexico, where output has fallen 75% from its 2004 peak to just 500,000 barrels per day in 2011, according to U.S. EIA data. This is a great challenge for Mexico because not only did this field provide such a large share of Mexico’s total oil output but there are no other fields capable of replacing it in the short term. Reforms that will give international oil companies new access to Mexican oil fields are supposed to change this overall trend. The government says it will increase oil production to as much as 4 million barrels per day by 2025.¶ However, it is one thing to allow private international oil companies to develop unexplored oil and gas fields. It is quite another to increase nationwide production significantly as a result. Even in Mexico the era of ‘easy oil’ is over. Technical assistance and foreign investment is sought from private international oil companies to exploit difficult-to-access reserves such as deep-water deposits in the Gulf of Mexico. This has to be differentiated from offshore energy production in shallow water where PEMEX has a proven track record. In addition, PEMEX is reeling under large financial losses while still funding about one third of the government’s budget through taxes.

#### Mexican collapse destroys U.S. global engagement – outweighs and turns the case

Haddick, 8 (Robert, Managing Editor, Small Wars Journal, former U.S. Marine Corps officer, advisor for the State Department and the National Intelligence Council on irregular warfare issues, former Director of Research at the Fremont Group, http://westhawk.blogspot.com/2008/12/now-that-would-change-everything.html)

There is one dynamic in the literature of weak and failing states that has received relatively little attention, namely the phenomenon of “rapid collapse.” For the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods. The collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems. The collapse of Yugoslavia into a chaotic tangle of warring nationalities in 1990 suggests how suddenly and catastrophically state collapse can happen - in this case, a state which had hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics at Sarajevo, and which then quickly became the epicenter of the ensuing civil war. In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico. Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons. That “perfect storm” of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used. The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by the Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone. Yes, the “rapid collapse” of Mexico would change everything with respect to the global security environment. Such a collapse would have enormous humanitarian, constitutional, economic, cultural, and security implications for the U.S. It would seem the U.S. federal government, indeed American society at large, would have little ability to focus serious attention on much else in the world. The hypothetical collapse of Pakistan is a scenario that has already been well discussed. In the worst case, the U.S. would be able to isolate itself from most effects emanating from south Asia. However, there would be no running from a Mexican collapse.

### 1NC

Next off is the counterplan

#### Text: The United States federal government should establish a Department of International Development as per the recommendations of the HELP Commission. The Department of International Development should offer a trade agreement to Mexico to designate Mexican food crops as special products exempt from full trade liberalization requirements and establish special safeguard mechanisms.

#### CP solves better – creates the necessary coordination for successful economic engagement

Carol C. Adelman, et al, 2007, report of the HELP Commission, Carol Adelman is a senior fellow and director of Hudson Institute's Center for Global Prosperity, where she publishes the annual Index of Global Philanthropy, the first comprehensive guide to philanthropic flows to developing countries, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/pdf/beyond\_assistence.pdf

HELP COMMISSION RECCOMMENDATIONS 🡪

The new Department of International Development would be led by a Cabinet-level Secretary appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The DID Secretary would, along with counterparts at the Departments of State, Defense, and other agencies, be a member of the NSC. Also, along with the Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce and other Cabinet members, the DID Secretary would serve as a member of the NEC. The Department’s internal structure would include regional but also, and importantly, functional bureaus focused on the priorities established by the Department’s development policy. Buttressed by DID’s authority to set development policy, these functional bureaus would allow the United States to address key development challenges that are distinct from diplomatic imperatives but that currently suffer from the structural absence of designated leadership within the Executive branch. Agencies that are exceptionally well run and easily coordinated and that do not manage primary development assistance accounts but do provide critical and discrete contributions to U.S. development efforts — such as the Peace Corps, U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA), Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) — would be independent of the new Department.¶

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The Commissioners who support the Cabinet-level option point out that the United States Trade Representatives Office (USTR), created in a 1979 reorganization that consolidated and broadened the former Special Trade Representative that had been located in the Executive Office of the President and was strengthened under legislation enacted in 1988 that effectively raised the USTR to Cabinet level, has been an enormous success. Giving the trade function, a Cabinet rank enhanced the importance of trade within the Executive branch. As a result, USTR was able to attract and retain highly professional staff and build a reputation for being both agile and effective. In contrast, the attempt to improve the effectiveness of public diplomacy by merging the United States Information Agency (USIA) with State has not been considered a success.¶ Commissioners who support the independent agency model suggested that, in addition to an adapted Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and cones for management and human resource development, functional bureaus should be established. This would bolster the DID’s comparative advantage, ability and authority within the Executive branch to lead critical development strategies rather than simply oversee project funding in key sectors. Specifically, this would mean focusing on:¶ 1. Capacity-building in support of production and trade, infrastructure development, and good governance necessary to strengthen weak and failing states and assist their integration into regional and the global economy;¶ 2. United States support for the Millennium Development Goals and basic human needs;¶ 3. Infectious diseases; and 4. Addressing strategic vulnerabilities, including the full range of transnational threats — such as climate change, international crime, and illicit trade — that can undermine development gains.¶ Commissioners supporting the creation of a new, Cabinet-level agency mandated to lead U.S. development policy cited as their primary rationale the need, given a rapidly-changing world, to enhance America’s ability to pursue long-term national interests by vesting leadership, authority, and resources in a department dedicated to promoting development. While these Commissioners believe that the other options might intend to elevate development, they concluded that an empowered independent agency best ensures that development achieves the status it deserves, alongside defense and diplomacy.

#### CP avoids the link to politics – shifts blame

David Schoenbrod, Professor of Law @ New York Law School, Power Without Responsibility, 1993 p. 10

Congress and the president delegate for much the same reason that they continue to run budget deficits. With deficit spending, they can claim credit for the benefits of their expenditures yet escape blame for the costs. The public must pay ultimately of course, but through taxes levied at some future time by some other officials. The point is not that deficits always have bad economic consequences, but that they have the political consequence of allowing officials to duck responsibility for costs. Likewise, delegation allows legislators to claim credit for the benefits which a regulatory statute promises yet escape the blame for the burdens it will impose, because they do not issue the laws needed to achieve those benefits. The public inevitably must suffer regulatory burdens to realize regulatory benefits, but the laws will come from an agency that legislators can then criticize for imposing excessive burdens on their constituents. Just as deficit spending allows legislators to appear to deliver money to some people without taking it from others, delegation allows them to appear to deliver regulatory benefits without Imposing regulatory costs. It provides "a handy set of mirrors—so useful in Washington—by which a politician can appear to kiss both sides of the aisle.

### 1NC

#### “Engagement” requires the provision of positive incentives

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 1-2

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### Violation: they’re negative engagement. They allow protectionist policies to block expanding ties.

**Plan isn’t --- voting issue:**

**Limits --- our interp functionally narrows the topic because few cases can defend conditioning—any alternative explodes the negative’s research burden**

**Ground --- locks in core generics like soft power DAs, counterplans to add or remove a condition, and “say no” and backlash arguments**

**Bidirectionality is bad – makes the topic unpredictable, negs have to prepare for both positive and negative engagement**

## Case

### Leadership

#### Nafta not key to all of US influence -- that was cross ex

#### Plan can’t boost legitimacy or soft power---alt causes overwhelm

Kudryashov 11 - Roman Kudryashov, Researcher: Applied Politics & Economics, the New School, May 17, 2011, “Democracy Promotion in between Domestic and International Needs,” online: http://whataretheseideas.wordpress.com/2011/05/17/democracy-promotion-in-between-domestic-and-international-needs/

Additionally, America must occasionally pause for self reflection (in an attempt to understand how other people view the nation): While America advertises democratization, policy choices, alliances, and domestic conditions all run counter argument. Where the CFR report suggests switching some media programming into a C-SPAN format to show how democratic politics work (Albright p.32), I argue that the bitter partisan politics leading to budget deadlocks in congress, the radicalizing ideology of the Tea Party, George Bush’s blatant disregard of UN Security Council advice on invading Iraq, and the illegitimate politics of Wisconsin’s Scott Walker in the face of a state-wide strike advertise the failings of the American democratic system 21. As far as neoliberal policies that America packages with its democratization program go, Joseph Stieglitz points out that with the distribution of wealth in America, the nation more and more begins to resemble the autocratic regimes it is criticizing (Stieglitz 1).

As Michael Pocalyko points out at the end of the CFR dissenting views, “Abu Ghraib matters infinitely more than Americans realize. Its effects are enduring. These human rights abuses were a stunning desecration of American values and a psychological assault on Islam. No one…in the Arab nations has ‘moved on’” (Albright p.47). Likewise, Washington’s almost-axiomatic support for Israel will mean that America will be blamed by proxy for whatever conflicts and injustices arise out of the Israeli-Arab and Palestinian conflicts 22. America would do well to be careful of the image it creates for itself in international affairs---the adverse reactions to American democracy promotion confirm that Arabic civil society responds to what America does, not what it says, so a strategic planning approach concerning how America is perceived would argue for repairing America’s reputation through policy changes, before embarking on noble goals of democracy promotion.

#### Mexico not key to power projection -- other latin American countries solve multilat

#### Multiple alt causes to Mexican ag

Carvallo, Negocios, 2012

[Sergio Carvallo, September 2012, Mexico’s Food and Agriculture Sector, “Mexican agriculture: An Arable Land of Opportunity,” <http://www.promexico.gob.mx/archivos/promx_Magazine/26/pdfFile_26_NE0912_WEB_SPREADS.pdf>, pg. 12-13]

Mexico has an important natural resource that is fundamental for agriculture: the sun. Furthermore, the floating exchange rate is a plus for the agribusiness sector as are gov- ernment-sponsored marketing programs and contract agriculture in the case of corn, barley and other crops. An untapped treasure of idle agricultural land can also be found, particu- larly in Mexico’s southern tropical areas.¶ However, in order for Mexico’s agribusi- ness sector to reach its full potential, some challenges must be faced. For instance, those related to promoting a more produc- tive use of the land. There are certain farm- ers’ organizations that need to adopt a more market-oriented approach and introduce¶ available technologies into their production processes to improve their productivity. The inefficient use and scarcity of water in cer- tain regions also needs to be tackled in or- der to prevent production losses. Addition- ally, the production of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) has to be addressed to improve productivity in the countryside, strengthening Mexico’s food security.

#### Multilat fails-structural barriers

David Held, Professor of Politics and International Relations, 13, , at the University of Durham AND Thomas Hale, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University AND Kevin Young, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, 5/24/13, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation

The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common.¶ Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems – indeed it is – but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries.

#### Conflicting interests

**Barma et al., Naval Postgraduate School national security affairs professor, 2013**

(Naazneen, “The Mythical Liberal Order”, National Interest, March/April, http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/the-mythical-liberal-order-8146, ldg)

Assessed against its ability to solve global problems, the current system is falling progressively further behind on the most important challenges, including financial stability, the “responsibility to protect,” and coordinated action on climate change, nuclear proliferation, cyberwarfare and maritime security. The authority, legitimacy and capacity of multilateral institutions dissolve when the going gets tough—when member countries have meaningfully different interests (as in currency manipulations), when the distribution of costs is large enough to matter (as in humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa) or when the shadow of future uncertainties looms large (as in carbon reduction). Like a sports team that perfects exquisite plays during practice but fails to execute against an actual opponent, global-governance institutions have sputtered precisely when their supposed skills and multilateral capital are needed most. WHY HAS this happened? The hopeful liberal notion that these failures of global governance are merely reflections of organizational dysfunction that can be fixed by reforming or “reengineering” the institutions themselves, as if this were a job for management consultants fiddling with organization charts, is a costly distraction from the real challenge. A decade-long effort to revive the dead-on-arrival Doha Development Round in international trade is the sharpest example of the cost of such a tinkering-around-the-edges approach and its ultimate futility. Equally distracting and wrong is the notion held by neoconservatives and others that global governance is inherently a bad idea and that its institutions are ineffective and undesirable simply by virtue of being supranational. The root cause of stalled global governance is simpler and more straightforward. “Multipolarization” has come faster and more forcefully than expected. Relatively authoritarian and postcolonial emerging powers have become leading voices that undermine anything approaching international consensus and, with that, multilateral institutions. It’s not just the reasonable demand for more seats at the table. That might have caused something of a decline in effectiveness but also an increase in legitimacy that on balance could have rendered it a net positive. Instead, global governance has gotten the worst of both worlds: a decline in both effectiveness and legitimacy. The problem is not one of a few rogue states acting badly in an otherwise coherent system. There has been no real breakdown per se. There just wasn’t all that much liberal world order to break down in the first place. The new voices are more than just numerous and powerful. They are truly distinct from the voices of an old era, and they approach the global system in a meaningfully different way.

#### Can’t leverage power

Maher 11---adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1)

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what conditions---military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

#### Alliances are out dated, multi-polarity is stable and there is no scenario for war in a world of US decline

**Friedman et al., MIT political science PhD candidate, 2012**

(Benjamin, “Why the U.S. Military Budget is ‘Foolish and Sustainable”, Orbis, 56.2, Science Direct, ldg)

Standard arguments for maintaining the alliances come in two contradictory strains. One, drawn mostly from the run-up to World War II, says that without American protection, the ally would succumb to a rival power, either by force or threat of force, heightening the rival’s capability and danger to the United States. The other argument says that without the United States, the ally would enter a spiral of hostility with a neighbor, creating instability or war that disrupts commerce and costs America more than the protection that prevented it. The main problem with the first argument is that no hegemon today threatens to unify Europe or Asia. Europe is troubled by debt, not conquest. Russian GDP is today roughly equivalent to that of Spain and Portugal combined. Whatever Russia’s hopes, it has no ability to resurrect its Soviet Empire, beyond perhaps those nations in its near abroad that Americans have no good reason to defend. Even today, the military capabilities of Europe’s leading powers are sufficient to defend its eastern flank, and they could increase their martial exertions should a bigger threat arise. Asia is tougher case. South Korea’s military superiority over its northern neighbor is sufficient to deter it from an attempt at forcible reunification. By heightening North Korea’s security, nuclear weapons may reinforce its capacity for trouble-making, but they do not aid offensive forays. U.S. forces long ago became unnecessary to maintaining the peninsula’s territorial status quo. Chinese efforts to engage in old-fashioned conquest are unlikely, at least beyond Taiwan. Its more probable objective is a kind of Asian Monroe doctrine, meant to exclude the United States.6 China naturally prefers not to leave its maritime security at the whim of U.S. policymakers and, thus, has sought to improve its anti-access and area-denial capabilities. In the longer term, China’s leaders will likely pursue the ability to secure its trade routes by building up longer-range naval forces. They may also try to leverage military power to extract various concessions from nearby states. Washington’s defense analysts typically take those observations as sufficient to establish the necessity that U.S. forces remain in Asia to balance Chinese military power. But to justify a U.S. military presence there, one also needs to show both that Asian nations cannot or will not balance Chinese power themselves and that their failure to do so would greatly harm U.S. security. Neither is likely. Geography and economics suggest that the states of the region will successfully balance Chinese power—even if we assume that China’s economic growth allows it to continue to increase military spending.7 Bodies of water are natural defenses against offensive military operations. They allow weaker states to achieve security at relatively low cost by investing in naval forces and coastal defenses. That defensive advantage makes balances of power more stable. Not only are several of China’s Asian rivals islands, but those states have the wealth to make Chinese landings on their coast prohibitively expensive. India’s mountainous northern border creates similar dynamics. The prospects of Asian states successfully deterring future Chinese aggression will get even better if, as seems likely, threats of aggression provoke more formal security alliances. Some of that is already occurring. Note for example, the recent joint statement issued by the Philippines and Japan marking a new ‘‘strategic partnership’’ and expressing ‘‘common strategic interests’’ such as ‘‘ensuring the safety of sea lines of communication.’’8 This sort of multilateral cooperation would likely deepen with a more distant U.S. role. Alliances containing disproportionately large states historically produce free-riding; weaker alliance partners lose incentive to shore up their own defenses.9 Even if one assumes that other states in the region would fail to balance China, it is unclear exactly how U.S. citizens would suffer. China’s territorial ambitions might grow but are unlikely to span the Pacific. Nor would absorbing a few small export-oriented states slacken China’s hunger for the dollars of American consumers. The argument that U.S. alliances are necessary for stability and global commerce is only slightly more credible. One problem with this claim is that U.S. security guarantees can create moral hazard—emboldening weak allies to take risks they would otherwise avoid in their dealings with neighbors. Alliances can then discourage accommodation among neighboring states, heightening instability and threatening to pull the United States into wars facilitated by its benevolence. Another point against this argument is that even if regional balancing did lead to war, it would not obviously be more costly to the U.S. economy than the cost of the alliance said to prevent it. Neutrality historically pays.10 The larger problem with the idea that our alliances are justified by the balancing they prevent is that wars generally require more than the mutual fear that arms competition provokes. Namely, there is usually a territorial conflict or a state bent on conflict. Historical examples of arms races alone causing wars are few.11 This confusion probably results from misconstruing the causes of World War I—seeing it as a consequence of mutual fear alone rather than fear produced by the proximity of territorially ambitious states.12 Balances of power, as noted, are especially liable to be stable when water separates would-be combatants, as in modern Asia. Japan would likely increase defense spending if U.S. forces left it, and that would likely displease China. But that tension is very unlikely to provoke a regional conflagration. And even that remote scenario is far more likely than the Rube Goldberg scenario needed to argue that peace in Europe requires U.S. forces stationed there. It is not clear that European states would even increase military spending should U.S. troops depart. If they did do so, one struggles to imagine a chain of misperceived hostility sufficient to resurrect the bad old days of European history.

#### No multilat – aff can’t overcome massive alt causes like Crimea, Iraq and Israel.

Zunes 3/18. Stephen, staff writer. “Russian Aggression Deserves a Response, But US Lacks Credibility to Lead It.” http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/22532-russian-aggression-deserves-a-response-but-us-lacks-credibility-to-lead-it

As someone who has spent his entire academic career analyzing and critiquing the U.S. role in the world, I have some news: While the United States has had significant impact (mostly negative in my view) in a lot of places, we are not omnipotent. There are real limits to American power, whether for good or for ill. Not everything is our responsibility.¶ This is certainly the case with Ukraine.¶ Delusions of Grandeur¶ On the right, you have political figures claiming that Obama's supposed "weakness" somehow emboldened Moscow to engage in aggressive moves against Crimea. Sarah Palin, for example, claims that Obama's failure to respond forcefully to Russia's bloody incursion into Georgia in 2008 made Russia's "invasion" possible, despite the fact that Obama wasn't even president then and therefore couldn't have done much.¶ Even some Democrats, like Delaware senator Chris Coons , claim that Obama's failure to attack Syria last fall made the United States look weak.¶ In reality, there seems to be little correlation between the willingness of Moscow to assert its power in areas within its traditional spheres of influence and who occupies the White House: The Soviets invaded Hungary in 1956 when Eisenhower was president; the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 when Johnson was president; the Soviets successfully pressed for martial law in Poland in 1981 when Reagan was president; the Russians attacked Georgia in 2008 when Bush was president. In each case, as much as these administrations opposed these actions, it was determined that any military or other aggressive counter-moves would likely do more harm than good. Washington cannot realistically do any more in response to Russian troops seizing Crimea in 2014 in the name of protecting Russian lives and Russian bases than Moscow could do in response to U.S. troops seizing Panama in 1989 in the name of protecting American lives and American bases.¶ There is an equally unrealistic view of supposed American omnipotence from some segments of the left in their claims that the United States was somehow responsible for the popular uprising that toppled the Yanukovych regime last month.¶ First of all, it's not true that the United States government " spent $5 billion to destabilize Ukraine ," as some agitators have claimed. That figure is the total amount of money provided to the country since independence in 1991, which includes aid to pro-Western Ukrainian administrations (which the United States presumably would not have wanted to destabilize). Like most U.S. foreign aid, some of it went for good things and some for not so good things. There was also some funding through the National Endowment for Democracy and other organizations to some opposition groups that were involved in the recent insurrection, but this was in the millions of dollars, nothing remotely close to $5 billion. And this aid went primarily to centrist groups, not the far right, so claims that the United States "supported fascists" in Ukraine are without foundation.¶ It's also unfair to imply that such aid was somehow the cause of the uprising, thereby denying agency to the millions of Ukrainians who took to the streets in an effort to determine (for better or worse) their own future. To claim that U.S. aid was responsible for the Orange Revolution of 2005 or the more recent revolt is as ludicrous as President Reagan's claims in the 1980s that Soviet aid was responsible for the leftist revolutions in Central America.¶ The uprising that overthrew Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and his allied pro-Russian oligarchs was not a classic nonviolent pro-democracy uprising like those that have toppled scores of dictatorships in recent decades. Yanukovych was democratically elected, and the forces that ousted him included—though were not dominated by—armed, neo-fascist militias. At the same time, Yanukovych's rampant corruption, repression, and divide-and-rule tactics had cost him his legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of Ukrainians. The protesters were primarily liberal democrats who engaged in legitimate acts of nonviolent resistance against severe government repression, many of whom spent months in freezing temperatures in a struggle for a better Ukraine dominated by neither Russia nor the West. To label them as simply puppets of Washington is as unfair as labeling peasant revolutionaries in El Salvador as puppets of Moscow.¶ At the same time, given that the new government includes corrupt neoliberal oligarchs along with representatives of the far right, it would be equally wrong to assume that the change of government represents some kind of major progressive democratic opening. And the refusal of the opposition to abide by the compromise agreement of February 21—which called for early elections and limited presidential powers—and seize power directly raises questions regarding the legitimacy of the new government. Whether for good or for ill, however, and despite whatever attempts Western powers have made to influence the outcome, the change of government is ultimately the responsibility of Ukrainians, not the Obama administration.¶ While the United States and the European Union no doubt want to lure Ukraine in a pro-Western direction and the Russians even more desperately want Ukraine to stay within their orbit, Ukrainians themselves—given the country's centuries of subjugation—are strongly nationalistic and do not want to be under the control of Russia or the West. With a population of 45 million and significant agricultural and industrial capacity, they are not a country that would passively accept foreign domination.¶ Just as U.S. military action in the greater Middle East in the name of protecting Americans from Islamist extremism has ended up largely encouraging Islamist extremism, Russia's actions in the name of protecting Russians from right-wing Ukrainian ultranationalists will likely only encourage that tendency as well. The United States, therefore, needs to avoid any actions that could encourage dangerous ultranationalist tendencies among either Russians or Ukrainians. Polls show most Russians are at best ambivalent about the Kremlin's moves in Ukraine. Provocative actions by the United States would more likely solidify support for Russian president Vladimir Putin's illegitimate actions.¶ One factor that may have partly motivated Russian moves in Ukraine could have been talk by U.S. officials of incorporating Ukraine in the NATO alliance, a move which—given the history of foreign invaders conquering Russia through the Ukraine—would be completely unacceptable to the Kremlin. However, Russia's moves in Crimea may make such a scenario more likely rather than less likely.¶ To ease such tensions, even such hawks as former U.S. National Security Advisers Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski acknowledge the limits of American power in such a situation and have proposed a compromise whereby Ukraine, like Finland during the Cold War, would be prohibited from joining any formal military alliance, and its Russian-speaking areas would be granted a degree of autonomy. Should President Obama consider such a compromise, however, he would almost certainly be attacked not only by Republicans but by hawkish Democrats as well.¶ Indeed, Obama's former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in comparing Putin to Adolph Hitler, has contributed to a political climate making the Obama administration's ability to accept such a compromise all the more difficult.¶ US Leadership¶ Thousands of Russian troops have fanned out from Russian bases in Crimea and, under Russian control, the Crimean parliament—dominated by ethnic Russians—has unilaterally declared independence and called for a snap referendum to reincorporate the peninsula into Russia. (Update: The referendum's results, announced on March 17, showed 97 percent of Crimean voters supported joining Russia.) This referendum was a clear violation of the 1994 Budapest Treaty—signed by Russia, Ukraine, the United States, France, Great Britain, and China—guaranteeing, in return for Ukraine giving up its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union, the country's territorial integrity and security assurances against threats or use of force.¶ As a result, there does need to be a strong international response to Russia's aggrandizement. Unfortunately, the United States is hardly in a position to take leadership on the matter.¶ For example, Secretary of State John Kerry has chastised Putin's actions in Crimea on the grounds that "You just don't invade another country on phony pretext in order to assert your interests," adding that Russia's actions constituted a "direct, overt violation of international law."¶ While this is certainly a valid statement in itself, it's ironic coming from a man who so vigorously supported the illegal U.S. invasion of Iraq on the phony pretext that Saddam Hussein had "weapons of mass destruction." Indeed, while Obama, to his credit, opposed the Iraq War, the fact that he appointed so many supporters of that illegal invasion and occupation to major foreign policy positions in his administration has severely weakened the United States' ability to assume leadership in challenging the Kremlin on its own unilateral excesses.¶ Similarly, in 2004, Kerry, Joe Biden, and other members of Congress who later became key Obama administration officials unconditionally endorsed then-Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon's plan to incorporate large sections of the occupied West Bank into Israel, a proposal denounced by international legal authorities worldwide as an illegal annexation. This makes it difficult for the Obama administration to be taken seriously when it denounces the illegality of the referendum to have Crimea incorporated into Russia.¶ There is also the fact that the Obama administration appears willing to accept Morocco's illegal takeover of occupied Western Sahara (under the autocratic monarchy's dubious "autonomy" proposal) in defiance of international law, a landmark 1975 World Court decision, and a series of United Nations resolutions. While illegitimate, the Russians are at least willing offer the people of Crimea a choice in a referendum. By contrast, the United States has effectively abandoned the U.N.'s insistence that there be a referendum in occupied Western Sahara, apparently in the recognition that the vast majority of Western Saharans would vote for independence.¶ In short, the history of U.S. support for its allies' land grabs and its own history of illegal invasions, the United States has little credibility to take leadership in this crisis.¶ This in no way justifies or minimizes the seriousness of Russia's aggression, of course. However, it underscores the fact that international leadership is not just a matter of being "tough." It means being willing to abide by and defend the same international legal norms for yourself and your allies as you demand of your adversaries. Until there is such a change in policies, there is little the United States can do.

### Trade

#### Trade leadership is permanently damaged and they can’t overcome alt causes

**Kim, Heritage policy analyst, 2010**

(Anthony, “A trade war averted for now”, 4-12, <http://blog.heritage.org/2010/04/12/a-trade-war-averted-for-now/>, ldg)

So, a trade war was avoided. More precisely, it has been delayed. Considerable murkiness lingers on the trade horizon, and not just with Brazil. As Friday’s WSJ editorial points out: \* WTO-approved retaliation to counteract U.S. trade violations is spreading. More than $3.4 billion [in] U.S. exports now face punishing retaliation tariffs. \* The U.S.’s most economically damaging trade war is with Mexico. As part of the North American Free Trade Agreement ([NAFTA]), the U.S. is supposed to give Mexican trucking companies access to the U.S. But 17 years into [NAFTA], Mexican trucks still don’t cross the border, because the Teamsters union won’t accept the competition. A [NAFTA] dispute panel [has] authorized Mexico to retaliate. Last year it imposed duties on $2.4 billion of U.S. exports. \* The [European] Union and Japan have also asked the WTO for authorization to retaliate because the U.S. Commerce Department insists on deciding antidumping cases with an arcane calculation that the WTO ruled against in 2007. As a result, according to the trade publication “Inside U.S. Trade”, both Japan and the European Union are eyeing retaliation. The total value of U.S. exports affected could top $500 million. The fallout from U.S. protectionism will hurt our ongoing economic recovery efforts. The protectionism itself is doing irrevocable damage to America’s leadership in international economic discussions. Free trade and its expansion through multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements have been vital to world economic strength and prosperity. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner commented during his recent two-day visit to India that President Obama “was ‘deeply committed’ to trying to build a consensus among Americans for more open trade and to support the [economic] recovery,” as noted in the Financial Times. While the Obama Administration has repeatedly said that the U.S. will not abandon its legacy of supporting open and free commerce, the fact is that it has done little to nothing to demonstrate that commitment in more substantive terms. One sign of inaction: three pending free trade agreements with Panama, Colombia, and South Korea remain on ice. Talking about “strengthening” America’s trade relations around the world, boosting exports, and even enforcing trade rules are only empty gestures without tangible action to re-establish America’s leadership in advancing free trade.

#### Low level protectionism is inevitable-empirically doesn’t escalate

**Zappone, Morning Harold Correspondent, 2012**

(Sidney, “Murkey Protectionism on the Rise but No Trade War”, 1-10, lexis, ldg)

At the outset of the global financial crisis, the world’s leaders pledged to resist calls to shield their local economies in order to prevent a trade war that could further damage global growth. Four years on, with China slowing, Europe heading into recession and a political environment soured by successive financial crises, the question arises: how long will policymakers be able to resist those calls for more protectionism? “Free trade is going to be under pressure,” said Lowy Institute international economy program director Mark Thirlwell. “Since 2007-08 the case for moving to greater trade liberalisation has got tougher and the demands for protection have increased.” Only last week, China, which is grappling with a slowdown, raised the prospect of a trade war with the European Union in response to the EU's implementation of a carbon emissions tax on air travel to and from Europe. Earlier last month China imposed tariffs up to 21 per cent on US-made cars, affecting about $US4 billion imports a year. Advertisement Across the Pacific, US politicians in the throes of an election year with 8.5 per cent unemployment have issued more strident calls for China to “play by the rules” and allow the yuan to appreciate faster against the US dollar. The US has also asked the World Trade Organisation to probe China's support for its solar panel industry and the restrictions Beijing has placed on US poultry imports. In fact, the most recent WTO data shows that the number of trade restrictive measures enacted by members rose 53 per cent to 339 occurrences over the year to October. Yet the WTO admits that the motives behind the spate of actions aren’t always simply to protect local jobs. “Not all measures categorized as trade restrictive may have been adopted with such an intention,” the body said. In Brazil, for example, the steep rise in the value of its currency, the real, has sparked a torrent of car imports into the country - similar to the online-overseas shopping boom in Australia. Brazil has in turn put a one-year provisional 30 per cent increase on auto imports, to counterbalance the effects of their strong currency. In the US, China and Australia, infrastructure spending measures contain “buy local” requirements to stoke domestic growth, not necessary punish foreign businesses. The federal government in September streamlined its anti-dumping system that eases the way for companies to ask for investigations into imported goods that come in below market value to Australia. Again, well within the rules. “What we’ve seen is a gradual ratcheting up of trade intervention,” said Mr Thirlwell, amounting to what he calls “murky protectionism” or government intervention through support for industries or complaints to global trade authorities. To date, observers such as Mr Thirlwell say most countries have remained remarkably resistant to throwing up significant trade barriers. For example, in November, the US, Australia and seven other Asian-Pacific nations including Japan, outlined the plan for an ambitious multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership trade block worth 40 per cent of the world’s trade, in an effort to increase the flow of cross-border goods and investment. Japan, China and South Korea are also in the later stages of negotiation over a free trade deal between those three nations. Australian National University international trade lecturer John Tang doesn’t believe the world is on the edge a new round of protectionism. “I don’t see a general sea change towards protectionism for major trading blocs but that may be because so much of the industrialised world is relying on developing countries to sustain their exports,” he said. Nevertheless, a shift in the political reality of the US, China or elsewhere could change that, he said. Washington DC-based Brookings Institution fellow Joshua Meltzer said that if the euro zone broke up, elevating the crisis to a new stage, nations may switch to much more protective measures. ‘‘I wouldn’t go so far to say the global economy is so integrated that we could never have anything that would approach a trade war,” said Washington DC-based Brookings Institution fellow Joshua Meltzer. “But I don’t think we’re on that track.”

#### No cascading protectionism

**Ahearn, CRS International Trade specialist, 2009**

(Raymond, “The Global Economic Downturn and Protectionism,” 3-23, <http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19395.pdf>, ldg)

There are a number of reasons why the threat of a return to protectionist, beggar-thy-neighbor policies could be vastly overstated. Unlike the 1930s, today’s global economy has several strong firewalls to prevent governments from raising trade barriers that result in a cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation. These firewalls include more institutionalized obstacles to protectionism built into the WTO system, more policy instruments to address the economic slowdown, and a more interdependent and open world economy than existed in the 1930s. In addition, some in today’s media may tend to overstate the threat of protectionism by not always distinguishing between protectionist actions and protectionist pressures and/or by equating legitimate forms of protection with protectionism. The fact that there is ample room for increases in trade measures and barriers that are consistent with the rules and obligations of the WTO often may go unappreciated in some press coverage. These trade measures and barriers include increases in applied tariffs to bound rates, and imposition of countervailing and antidumping duties, so-called ‘defensive’ trade measures.4 Protection for limited periods of time and under prescribed conditions is built into the rules of the WTO as a political safety valve and as a recognition of the human and social costs that are associated with the often wrenching adjustments that accompany increased trade competition. Firewalls Against Protectionism WTO rules today serve to keep a lid on trade barriers of its 153 members through an elaborate set of mutual obligations and dispute settlement procedures. Unlike the 1930s when countries could impose higher trade barriers unilaterally without violating any international agreements or anticipating a foreign reaction, under today’s rules members can take their disputes to the WTO for settlement rather than engaging in reciprocal retaliatory actions. The fact that countries violating WTO obligations can face WTO-sanctioned retaliation helps constrain outbreaks of unilateral actions that could be mutually harmful.5 Pressures for protection are also dampened by a world economy that is much more interdependent and integrated than in the 1930s.6 Leading producers have become so international in their production operations and supply chains that they have developed a vested interest in resisting protectionism.7 Many industries that have faced import competition in the past – such as televisions and semiconductors—have found that international diversification or joint ventures with foreign partners are a more profitable way of coping with global competition than blocking goods at the border. In addition, many domestic industries have less incentive to ask for import restrictions because foreign rivals now produce in the domestic market, eliminating the benefits of trade barriers for domestic firms.8 Unlike the early 1930s, when governments took little responsibility for propping up financial institutions and were unable to pursue expansionary monetary policies due to fixed exchange rates under the gold standard, policymakers around the world today are adopting expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. These expansionary policies, in turn, have the capability of dampening protectionist pressures and demands that stem from job losses and related economic hardship with lower interest rates and increased expenditures on unemployment benefits and health care benefits.9 A related consideration is that today’s world economy is much more open than the world economy of the 1930s. Average tariffs on world trade have come down from the 50% range in the 1930s, to the 25% range in the 1980s, and to less than 10% today.10 Under these circumstances, it would require tremendous increases in protection to get the world back to anywhere near the conditions of the 1930s, although a major increase in tariffs (e.g. a doubling) would be disruptive even if it left tariffs well below the 1930s levels. Scorecard of Protective Measures To Date Empirical support exists for the view that existing legal, economic, and political firewalls are restraining today’s protectionist pressures. Most importantly, Pascal Lamy, the WTO’s Director General, reported in January 2009 that most WTO members have successfully kept domestic protectionist pressures under control “with only limited evidence of increases in trade restricting or trade distorting measures” taken during the last six months of 2008. This assessment was based on the first report of the WTO secretariat on the trade effects of the global economic crisis. The report found only “limited evidence” of an increase in tariffs, non-tariff barriers or trade-remedy actions by member countries, but noted that the most significant actions taken in response to the global crisis have involved “financial support of one kind or another to banks and other financial institutions and to certain industries, notably the automobile industry.”11 The WTO report notes tariff increases on selected products being implemented by India, Russia, Ecuador, and Ukraine. Countries adopting non-tariff measures include Indonesia (port of entry barriers) and Argentina (import licensing requirements). Argentina was cited for measures that attempt to boost exports of selected products. But the report indicates that there has been “no dramatic increase” in antidumping investigations in the second half of 2008 compared to first half of 2008, but raised the possibility of increased trade remedy actions in 2009.12 The World Bank, which has also been monitoring trade restrictions proposed and adopted since the beginning of the financial crisis, reached a conclusion similar to that of the WTO. Its initial report determined that there have been 47 trade restrictive measures imposed since the financial crisis began last summer, including 17 from G-20 countries, but that “these measures have probably had only marginal effects on trade flows to date.” In addition to the measures cited by the WTO, the World Bank report cited China’s import ban on various food products from the EU, and export subsidies provided by the EU, China, and India. Contrary to the WTO report, the World Bank report determined that “the number of antidumping cases (both investigations initiated and imposition of duties) surged in 2008.”13

#### Trade doesn’t solve war

Martin et al., Paris School of Economics, 2008

(Phillipe, “Make Trade Not War?”, Review of Economic Studies, <http://econ.sciences-po.fr/sites/default/files/file/tmayer/MMT.pdf>, ldg)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 suggests however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.